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COMMENTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS
MORE ABOUT PUBLIC SAFETY V. INDIVIDUAL CIVIL LIBERTIES
FRED E. INBAU*
An article by Professor Inbau entitled "Public Safety v. Individual Civil Liberties: The Prosecutor's Stand" was published in the March, 1962, issue of the Journal (Vol. 53, No. 1) at pp. 85-89.
Professor Inbau's paper evoked a detailed response from Professor Yale Kamisar of the University
of Minnesota, which appeared in the June, 1962, number of the Journal (Vol. 53, No. 2) at pp. 171-93.
The Inbau article also brought forth strong criticisms from two Journalreaders; their comments appeared in the June, 1962, number (Vol. 53, No. 2) at pp. 231-32. In the comment which follows,
Professor Inbau replies to his critics. A concluding comment by Professor Kamisar is scheduled
to appear in the December number of the Journal.-EDITR.
Whenever a champion of individual civil liberties
is branded as anti-American or as a fellow traveler
of the Communists he becomes highly incensed.
And rightly so, because there is nothing unAmerican about being a civil libertarian, even of
the starry-eyed variety; and a person can be an
avid civil libertarian without embracing Communism. But many civil libertarians are themselves
subject to the same fallacious reasoning with
which their critics are sometimes afflicted. They
assume that when a person criticizes court decisions which he considers too restrictive of police
functions, that critic must be in favor of a "police
state"; he must be of a Fascist bent of mind; he
must be interested in allowing the police to do
anything they please; he must favor the use of the
"third degree," illegal searches and seizures, and
all other police practices that the courts have
condemned.'
It is high time that we shed ourselves of the kind
of intolerance and misconceptions that prevail on
both sides.
* The author is a Professor of Law in Northwestern
University. Long active in the field of scientific evidence, he served from 1933 to 1938 as a member of the
staff of the Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory of
Northwestern University School of Law, and from
1938 to 1941 as Director of the Chicago Police Scientific
Crime Detection Laboratory. Professor Inbau has
been the Managing Director of this Journal since
1945 and is the author of Cases and Cqmments on
Criminal Justice (with Claude R. Sowle); Lie Detection
and Criminal Interrogation (3d ed. 1953) (with John
E. Reid); and Self-Incrimination:What Can an Accused
Person Be Compelled To Do? (1950).
I See particularly the criticism aimed at my views
in the letters published in the "Notes and Announcements" section of the June, 1962, number of this
Journal (53 J. Ciaz. L., C. & P.S. 231 (1962)).

The police will have to accept the fact that in
any democratic society police efficiency must
necessarily incur a considerable measure of sacrifice
in deference to the rights and liberties of the individual. They must realize that the public at large
has made that decision and the police have no
right to change it. On the other hand, the civil
libertarian must appreciate the fact that some
sacrifice of individual rights and liberties has to be
made in order to achieve and maintain a safe,
stable society in which the individual may exercise
those rights and liberties. They cannot be exercised in a vacuum. In the recent words of a
federal district court judge, "Pure liberty with no
restraints produces anarchy, while pure discipline
2
brings in the police state."1
In Professor Yale Kamisar's 23 page article in
the last issue of this Journal, replying to the four
page reproduction of a speech I had delivered at a
meeting of the National District Attorneys' Association, he quotes with approval Reinhold
Niebuhr's statement that "democracy is a method
of finding proximate solutions for insoluble problems." '3 Let me apply that fine statement to the
differing viewpoints which Professor Kamisar and
I have expressed with reference to the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Mapp v. Ohio-the 1961 case which imposed the exclusionary rule
4
upon all the states as a requirement of due process.
For many years the people of the State of Michi2Comment of Judge Wade H. McCree, Jr., quoted
in 3the Detroit News of Feb. 25, 1962.
Kamisar, Public Safety v. Individual Liberties:
Some "Facts" and "Theories", 53 J. CRlw. L., C. &
P.S. 171, 184 (1962).
4 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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gan sought to find a 'proximate solution" to the
"insoluble problem" of illegal search and seizure,
and they were struggling with the problem during
the time when the Supreme Court was holding
that the exclusionary rule was only a rule of evidence which the states were at liberty to accept or
reject.
By constitutional amendments in 1936 and 1952,
the people of the State of Michigan-not just their
representatives in the legislature-worked out
what they thought to be a "proximate solution"
to this "insoluble problem." They decided that the
exclusionary rule was a good rule except as regards
its application to narcotics and dangerous instrumentalities such as firearms and explosives. As to
these various articles, the prosecution could use
them as evidence regardless of the illegality of their
seizure, provided the seizure did not involve an
invasion of a person's home.5 Here, then, was a
democratic effort to arrive at a "proximate solution" to a very difficult problem-a problem that
all the states had wrestled with from time to time,
and, as we know, they were about evenly divided
at the time of the 1961 Mapp decision; half of the
states accepted and half rejected the exclusionary
rule.
What right, I again ask, did the Supreme Court
have to tell the people of Michigan, in its 6 to 3 decision in Mapp v. Ohio, that they were in gross
error as regards the "proximate solution" they
were seeking in their 1936 and 1952 amendments
to the Michigan constitution? Let us remember
that here was a state that had not ignored the
problem. To the contrary, it was earnestly seeking
a solution, and once again I call attention to the
fact that at the time when the people of Michigan
were making that effort they were privileged to do
so insofar as the United States Supreme Court was
concerned, because all along the Court had considered the exclusionary rule to be only a rule of
evidence; it did not evolve into a due process requirement until the 6 to 3 decision in Mapp v. Ohio
on June 19, 1961.
I do not think that the Court was justified in
holding that its judgment (or rather that of six of
the nine Justices) was superior to that exercized
by the people of Michigan and the many other
states that did not consider the exclusionary rule
to be the solution to the problem of illegal searches
and seizures. And if I am to be looked upon as a
legal heretic for thinking so, then I have the com5 MicH. CONST. 1908, art. II, §10 (as amended in
1936 and 1952).

[Vol. 53

pany of some respectable fellow heretics-the three
Justices who dissented in the Mapp case.6 Also
among my fellow heretics may be added the
majority of the members of Michigan's 1962
Constitutional Convention. They decided to indude in the proposed revised constitution a
provision which perpetuates the Michigan viewpoint as expressed by the people of that state in
their 1936 and 1952 amendments to their present
constitution. Moreover, the Convention did this
while fully aware of Mapp v. Ohio and all its
implications. They were sufficiently convinced
of the merits of their own "proximate solution"
to again declare-in rather specific defiance to
the Mapp decision-that the provisions of the
constitution regarding searches and seizures "shall
not be construed to bar from evidence in any
criminal proceeding any narcotic drug, firearm,
bomb, explosive or any other dangerous weapon,
seized by a peace officer outside the curtilage of
any dwelling house in.
this state."'
What the Supreme Court did in Mapp it is also
likely to do someday with respect to confessions
obtained by state law enforcement officers who
have interrogated arrestees while delaying in taking
them before a committing magistrate or while they
were without counsel during their police detention.
The Court may tell the states that they must
adopt the same rules and standards that the Court
has prescribed for federal courts and federal law
enforcement officers. And that possibility disturbs
me more than what the Court did in Mapp v. Ohio.
I think the effect would be disasterous to law enforcement and to the public's welfare and safety.
State law enforcement officers can live with the
exclusionary rule a lot easier than they could with
a McNabb-Mallory rule that would, in effect, prohibit local law enforcement officers from interrogating criminal suspects. 8 By modernizing the laws
of arrest and search and seizure, either by legislative enactments or court decisions (as the California and Illinois courts have done), there will be
far fewer occasions for the police to violate the law
6In this connection, I should also like to point out
that when I say that the Supreme Court has no right
to police the police, I have some company in the person
of Mr. Justice Harlan. See his dissent in Rea v. United
States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956).
MicH. CONsT., art. I, §11, as finally adopted by
the Convention on May 11, 1962. See No. 136A. State
of Michigan Journal of the Constitutional Convention.
8 For details of the McNabb-Mallory rule and its
application see Inbau, The Confession Dilemma in the
United States Supreme Court, 43 IL.n. L. Rzv. 442
(1948), and Inbau, Police Interrogation-A Practical
Necessity, 52 J. C im. L., C. & P.S. 16 (1961).
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as a matter of practical necessity; and there will be
less need for the courts to reject incriminating evidence. But to deprive the police of an opportunity
to conduct criminal interrogations-by a Supreme
Court decision founded upon constitutional considerations-would produce consequences* that
cannot be modified in the same way as is possible
with respect to arrests, searches and seizures.
Contrary to what Professor Kamisar implies, 9 I
am not one of those who attributes the rise in the
national crime rate, or even a substantial part of
it, to the "turn 'er loose" court decisions of the
past several years. There are other factors of considerably greater significance. However, I am convinced that some of the increase in crime is due
to such decisions, and this factor will enlarge in
significance if the present "turn 'er loose" trend
continues.
Critics of the view I expressed regarding the
decision in Mallory v. United States10 charge that
there is no statistical proof that the McNabbMallory rule seriously hampers the police of Washington, D. C., or that the rule seriously affects the
rate of convictions or of crime itself. They also
state that the FBI gets along very well with the
McNabb-Mallory rule. I cannot answer the first
point with any statistics of my own-and I do not
think statistics can support the opposite viewpoint
either-but some simple logic is available to support the proposition that the McNabb-Mallory
rule does, and is bound to have, a crippling effect
upon law enforcement in any metropolitan jurisdiction saddled with the rule. But before developing this point I first wish to state that the FBI
and the other national law enforcement agencies
are not confronted by the same crime problems
that are encountered by a metropolitan police
department such as that in Washington, D. C. For
instance, when the FBI is investigating cases like
those involving the interstate transportation of
stolen automobiles or of women for purposes of
prostitution, or even cases of suspected espionage,
there are many investigative procedures that may
be employed and relatively little need exists for
the interrogation of suspects themselves. Moreover,
time is usually not a critical factor, and manpower
and funds are ample for the volume of federal cases
to be investigated. But a vastly different situation
confronts the police of a city such as Washington,
D. C., with its high incidence of robberies, burglaries, rapes, etc.---crimes that ordinarily cannot
9 Kamisar, supra note 3, at 184.
10354 U.S. 449 (1957).

be solved except by the interrogation of the suspects themselves, since physical clues or any other
evidence of guilt are seldom available.
In communities such as Washington, D. C.,
most serious crimes will remain unsolved if the
police are not permitted to interrogate criminal
suspects. To prohibit police interrogation-which,
in effect, is what the McYabb-Mallory rule doesmeans, therefore, that fewer crimes will be solved
and successfully prosecuted. More criminals will
remain at large, to commit other offenses. At the
same time the deterrent effect of apprehension
and conviction will be lost insofar as other potential
offenders are concerned. The crime rate is bound
to be greater under such circumstances, and I do
not feel the need of statistics to support that conclusion.
One of my critics, Professor Alfred R.
Lindesmith,' states that "in England police handling of suspects is guided by the Judges' Rules
which, incidentally, forbid interrogation of the
defendant after arrest." The implication is that
the police in the United States could get by without interrogation opportunities. But I call Professor Lindesmith's attention to the fact that the
police in England, out of practical necessity, have
circumvented the rules out of existence; the
Judges' Rules are now dead letters in England. In
support of this statement I refer Professor Lindesmith to the published statements of two outstanding police officials and also to one of England's
most respected legal scholars, Professor Glanville
Williams.12 Moreover, in England the courts will
admit a confession obtained in violation of the
Judges' Rules if it is otherwise voluntary.
By way of some further answers to my critics, I
wish to repeat again several of my viewpoints
which have been stated publicly by me on many
previous occasions:
I am unalterably opposed to the "third degree"
11See Lindesmith, Letter to the Editor, 53 J. CRm.
L., C. & P.S. 231 (1962).
12 One such acknowledgment was made by the Chief
Constable of County Durham, England: St. Johnston,
The Legal Limitations of the Interrogation of Suspects
and Prisonersin England and Wales, 39 J. CRIM. L. &
C. 89 (1948). Another such acknowledgment was made
by the Commander of the Criminal Investigation Department, New Scotland Yard, London, England:
Hatherill, Practical Problems in Interrogation, in
INTERNATIONAL LECTURES ON POLICE SCIENCE (West-

er Reserve Univ., 1956). And see Williams, Police
Interrogation Priileges and Limitations Under Foreign
Law--England, 52 J. Cam. L., C. & P.S. 51 (1961),
republished in SowLE, POLICE POWER AND INDIvmUAL
FREDOm: THE QUEST FOR BALANCE 185 (1962).
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and to any other interrogation tactics or techniques
that are apt to make an innocent person confess.
I am opposed, therefore, to the use of force,
threats, or promises of leniency-all of which might
make an innocent person confess; but I do approve
of other types of psychological tactics and techniques that are necessary in order to secure incriminating information from the guilty, or investigative leads from otherwise uncooperative witnesses or prospective informants.
I am opposed to illegal police searches and
seizures, but I do not believe that the United States
Supreme Court had the right to order the states to
free guilty persons merely because the police had
acted illegally in obtaining the evidence of guilt.
I also feel that there are other ways to guard
against police lawlessness, and again I wish to
repeat what I have said many times before: The
only real, practically attainable protection we can
afford ourselves against police abuses of individual
rights and liberties is to see to it that our police
are selected and promoted on a merit basis, that
hey are properly trained, adequately compen-
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sated, and that they are permitted to remain substantially free from politically inspired interference. Along with these requirements I also add the
necessity for realistic laws and rules governing
arrest, search and seizure, and criminal interrogations, so that there will be no practical necessity
for evasion of the law by the police in their efforts
to furnish the protection and safety that the public
demands of them. Individual civil liberties can
survive in such an atmosphere, alongside the
protective security of the public.
One further point: I am not one of those persons
who feels that all criminals have to be caught and
sent to jail. I am perfectly willing to settle for the
apprehension and conviction of only enough of
them to discourage criminal conduct. What I do
object to is the present day trend on the part of
some courts and legislatures to lay down rules and
regulations which are making it almost impossible
to apprehend and convict anybody! It is time that
a balance be struck )etween individual civil liberties and public protection.

